



CENTRE FOR  
ECONOMIC POLICYRESEARCH 
 








Getting Ahead: The Determinants of and Payoffs to Internal Promotion for 






















                                                 
* Social Policy, Evaluation, Analysis and Research Centre and Economics Program Research School of Social 
Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra ACT, 0200, dcclark@coombs,anu.edu.au 
† The author would like to thank Yvonne Dunlop for her research assistance and seminar participants at the 
Australian National University for helpful comments.  Any errors remain my own.  




   Page 
Abstract  iii 
 
I Introduction  1 
 
II  The Promotion Chances of Men and Women  2 
 
III  Modelling the Role of Gender in the Promotion Process  4 
  The Theoretical Framework  4 
  The Role of Gender 6 
IV Data  7 
 
V  Getting Ahead: Gender Differences and the Promotion Process  10 
  Estimating the Determinants of Promotion  10 
  Considering Alternative Definitions of Promotion  14 
  The Source of the Gender Gap in Promotions  15 
 
VI  The Consequences of Promotion  18 
  Wage Growth as a Result of Promotion  18 
  The Share of Wage Growth Attributable to Promotion   20 
  Promotion Changes in the Gender Wage Gap 22 
 
VII Conclusion  24 
 
References   26 





Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, this paper examines the role of gender in the 
promotion process and the importance of promotions in the relative labor market outcomes of young men and 
women in their early careers. Specifically, how do the factors related to promotion differ for men and women? 
How do gender differences in promotion translate into differences in subsequent wage growth? To what extent 
does the promotions gap contribute to the gender wage gap? In answering these questions, alternative definitions 
of “promotion” will be considered. 
Getting ahead matters—particularly for women.  The results indicate that women are less likely to be promoted.  
This gender gap in promotions—the magnitude of which depends on the measure of promotion considered—is 
explained by differences in the returns to characteristics.  Had men and women in our sample faced the same 
promotion standard, promotion rates would have been higher for women than for men.  Furthermore, the share of 
overall wage growth attributable to promotion is much larger for women than for men reflecting a bifurcation in 
outcomes between women who get ahead and women who get left behind.  Eliminating gender differences in the 
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Historically, economists interested in the role of gender in the labor market have 
analyzed differences in labor market outcomes, most commonly wage rates, for men and 
women.  Recently, economists have begun to strive for a better understanding of the labor 
market mechanisms or processes that can give rise to gender differences in outcomes.  Labor 
market mobility—for example, quits, job changes, or promotions—has been of particular 
interest because of its importance in determining relative outcomes.  
This research adds to this expanding literature by reconsidering the role of gender 
differences in the promotion process and the importance of promotions in the relative labor 
market positions of young men and women in their early careers.  In addressing this issue, a 
sample of white men and women drawn from the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY) will be analyzed.  The primary focus will be on self-reported internal “promotion” 
and several alternative measures of promotion will be considered.  Because previous studies 
have not assessed the extent to which promotions for men and women may be influenced by 
macroeconomic conditions, information about industry and occupation employment growth 
rates calculated from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and labor-market unemployment 
rates will be incorporated into the analysis.  This research also adds to the previous literature 
by explicitly considering the sources of gender differences in promotion rates and the role of 
differential promotion rates in changes in the gender wage gap.  Throughout the analysis the 
panel nature of the NLSY data will be used to take individual heterogeneity into account. 
Getting ahead matters—particularly for women.  The results indicate that women are 
less likely to be promoted.  This gender gap in promotions—the magnitude of which depends 
on the measure of promotion considered—is explained by differences in the returns to 
characteristics.  Had men and women in our sample faced the same promotion standard, 
promotion rates would have been higher for women than for men.  Furthermore, the share of 
overall wage growth attributable to promotion is much larger for women than for men 
reflecting a bifurcation in outcomes between women who get ahead and women who get left 
behind.  Eliminating gender differences in the determinants of and wage payoffs to promotion 
would contribute to a narrowing of the gender wage gap. 
The previous literature on the relationship between gender and promotion will be 
reviewed in the following section of the paper, while the theoretical framework for the 
analysis is outlined in Section III.  Following that, the details of the data will be discussed.  In 
Section V, an analysis of promotion determinants for young NLSY men and women will be 
presented.  The gender gap in the probability of promotion will be decomposed into a  
2 
component due to differences in productivity-related characteristics and a component due to 
differences in the returns to characteristics.  Section VI considers the consequences of 
promotion for both wage growth and changes in the gender wage gap.  Finally, some general 
conclusions will be discussed in Section VII. 
 
II.  The Promotion Chances of Men and Women 
Empirical studies of the relationship between gender and promotions fall into one of 
three categories: studies of workers in specific occupations, studies of workers in a single 
firm, or, less commonly, studies of representative samples of workers across occupations and 
firms.
1  Most of these studies are cross-sectional and there have been only a handful of studies 
exploiting panel data techniques (Olson and Becker, 1983; McCue, 1996; Booth, et al., 
1998).  Though many studies conclude that the probability of promotion is lower for women 
(Hachen, 1988; Spurr 1990; Long et al., 1993; Paulin and Mellor, 1996; Pergamit and Veum, 
1999), this is not a universal finding.  Some studies find that gender has no significant effect 
on promotion (Jones and Makepeace, 1996; Hartman, 1987; Booth et al., 1998), while others 
conclude that women are significantly more likely to be promoted (Hersch and Viscusi, 
1996).  Still others suggest that the gender differential depends on other factors such as the 
time period (Eberts and Stone, 1985) or specific group of workers considered (Farber, 1977; 
DiPrete and Soule, 1988; McCue, 1996; Audas, et al., 1997). 
Differential promotion chances for men and women can generate a gap in relative 
wages in at least two related ways.  First, promotions may themselves directly influence 
wages and wage growth.  Second, the promotion process may be important in generating 
overall labor market segregation that is in turn related to relative wage rates.    
There is little consensus regarding the relative wage gains that result specifically from 
promotion.  Hersch and Viscusi (1996) find that the wage returns for promotion are much 
larger for male public utility workers, though Gehart and Milkovich (1989) find little 
evidence of a gender gap in the returns to promotion in manufacturing.  Results from 
representative workers across industries and occupations are similarly mixed (Olson and 
Becker, 1983; McCue, 1996; Booth, et al., 1998; Pergamit and Veum, 1999).  It is difficult to 
know what produces this variation in results since the studies differ on a number of 
dimensions, including the time period studied, the data analyzed, and the econometric 
methods used to deal with the endogeneity of promotion in determining wages.  Less is 
                                                 
1    See Spurr (1990), Hersch and Viscusi (1996), and McCue (1996) for recent reviews.  
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known about whether gender differences in promotion are an important source of overall 
labor market segmentation, though it seems reasonable to expect that there might be some 
relationship.
2  This remains an important question for future research because of the critical 
role of job segregation in generating gender differences in labor market outcomes (Bielby and 
Baron, 1986).  
In spite of a relatively large empirical literature and a somewhat smaller theoretical 
literature, there remains much we do not know about the role of gender in the promotion 
process.  Among other things, the existing literature leaves one wondering about the role of 
macroeconomic conditions.  Rosenbaum (1979) is one of the few researchers to address this 
issue and he concludes that promotion rates are higher in periods of greater firm growth.  He 
considers only white men, however, so it is not possible to say whether the same is true for 
women. 
In addition, while many studies have assessed the relationship between gender and 
promotion, there is remarkably little consensus about what that relationship is.  This most 
likely reflects the focus on assessing promotions within single occupations or firms and the 
subsequent difficulty in knowing the extent to which the results may be generalized to 
broader labor market groups.  We do not know what it is about the specific occupations, firms 
or time periods analyzed that might be responsible for the divergent results across these 
previous studies.   
In addition to its panel nature, one of the advantages of NLSY data over these 
alternative data sources is that we can explicitly consider alternative definitions of what it 
means to be “promoted”.3  This is important because Pergamit and Veum (1999) provide 
strong evidence that the determinants of and payoffs to promotion depend on the specific 
definition of “promotion” being considered.4   
This research builds upon these previous studies by considering alternative measures 
of promotion while taking individual heterogeneity into account.  Furthermore, rather than 
simply considering the determinants of promotion for men and women, the gender differential 
                                                 
2
  Interestingly, there is evidence that gender segregation does affect promotion chances.  Hachen (1988) finds 
that employment in female-dominated occupations increases upward authority job shifts for women. 
3  In addition, the sequencing of questions in the PSID results in only those individuals indicating that they had 
experienced a position change being asked whether or not that position change was a promotion.  The NLSY 
data suggest, however, that many workers report that they have in fact been promoted although there has been 
no change in their position (Pergamit and Veum, 1999). 
4 At the same time, in order to utilize the more detailed information about the type and timing of promotion 
found in the 1990 NLSY data the authors chose to focus on a cross-section of respondents who were 
interviewed in both 1989 and 1990.  Thus, they do not use the panel nature of the NLSY data to take 
individual heterogeneity into account.    
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in the probability of promotion will also be decomposed into two components: one which 
results from differences in underlying human capital characteristics and a second which 
results from differences in returns to those characteristics.  This latter exercise is important in 
light of Pergamit and Veum’s (1999) conclusion that their results provided “suggestive” 
evidence of discrimination in the promotion process.  In addition, variation in the wage payoff 
to promotion is assessed and a series of simulations provides evidence about how we might 
have expected the gender wage gap to change under alternative scenarios.  Finally, throughout 
the analysis information about industry and occupation employment growth and local labor-
market unemployment rates will be used to account for differences in macroeconomic 
conditions. 
 
III.  Modeling the Role of Gender in the Promotion Process 
The Theoretical Framework 
Theoretical models of promotion have explicitly incorporated gender into the 
promotion process by assuming that relative opportunities inside and outside the firm—
whether at other firms or at home—differ for men and women.  For example, Booth, et al. 
(1998) assume that within the firm women in higher job levels are subject to a Becker-type 
discrimination factor.  Consequently, women have the same promotion chances as men, but 
have lower wage gains upon promotion because the firm is less likely to retain women by 
matching their outside offers.
5  
Milgrom and Oster (1987) assume that women in lower job levels have relatively 
fewer outside opportunities because they are less visible to other employers.  Once promoted  
women become visible to other employers leading firms to try to hide productive women by 
not promoting them.  Lazear and Rosen (1990), on the other hand, assume that women in 
higher job levels have superior opportunities in non-market production.  Women must have 
higher ability to get promoted because they are more likely to leave the firm taking with them 
firm-specific human capital.
6  Both models imply that while women are less likely to be 
promoted, wage growth after promotion will be higher.  In a similar vein, Kuhn (1993) 
considers a model in which the firm shares training costs in some jobs but not in others.  If 
there are exogenous gender differences in quit rates, competitive, profit-maximizing firms 
will create separate job ladders for male and female employees. 
                                                 
5
  Lower wage gains upon promotion are also consistent with women having lower outside opportunities after 
promotion.  Lazear and Rosen (1990) make the opposite assumption and get the opposite prediction.  
5 
In general, however, the theoretical literature is not much help in sorting out the 
observed empirical relationships.  Predictions about relative promotion probabilities and 
subsequent wage growth depend critically on the following.  First, is relative productivity 
inside versus outside the firm assumed to be greater for men or for women?  Second, are 
differences in relative productivity assumed to exist before promotion in lower job levels, 
after promotion in higher job levels, or both?  Various theoretical predictions about 
promotion rates and subsequent wage growth can be generated by varying the answers to the 
above two questions.  We are as a result left with few empirically testable hypotheses.
7  
Combined with a lack of consensus in the existing empirical literature, it becomes even more 
difficult to sort out the stylized facts.  
The following extends Olson and Becker’s (1983) model of promotions to allow the 
probability of promotion to depend in part on the firm having a job opening at a higher level.  
The objective is not to generate a set of testable hypotheses or to test competing theoretical 
models, but rather to provide a framework that can be used to highlight the ways in which 
gender may enter the promotion process and to guide the choice of variables in the estimation. 
The probability of individual i being promoted to job j is a function of: 1) the 
probability that the firm decides to fill job j, 2) the probability that the expected value of 
individual i’s marginal product in job j exceeds some standard, and 3) the probability that the 
expected value of individual i’s marginal product exceeds all other applicants.  
Suppose jobs are assumed to have some inherent marginal product that is constant 
across individual workers but may vary over time.  (See Thurow, 1975.)  If firms decide to fill 
job j whenever economic conditions for the firm in period t are such that the value of this job-
specific marginal product exceeds some threshold level the probability the firm will fill job j 
is given by: 
) c   >   VMP P( jt
*
jt                                                               (1) 
where VMP
*
jt  is the value of the job-specific component of marginal product and c jt  is the 
relevant threshold.  
Suppose further that the probabilities that individual i will meet the promotion 
standard and be the most qualified applicant are given by: 
                                     
)] VMP E(   >   ) VMP P[E(
] s   >   ) VMP P[E(
njt ijt
jt ijt
                                                     (2) 
                                                                                                                                                        
6
  See Krowas (1993) for an extension of Lazear and Rosen (1990) to additional periods. 
7   See also Spurr (1990) on this point.  
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where  ) VMP E( ijt is a worker’s expected value of marginal product for all  1...N   =   i ,  jt s  is the 
promotion standard, and n is the next most qualified job applicant. Finally, a worker’s 
marginal product is assumed to depend in part on the job itself, but also on the human capital 
the worker brings to the job.  Specifically,  
ε ijt i
*
jt ijt 1 ijt   +   v   +   VMP   +   Z b   =   VMP                                               (3) 
where  Zijt is individual characteristics that vary across jobs and time,  vi is an unobserved 
individual-specific effect, and  jt ε  is a random error term.    Promotion occurs whenever 
equations (1) and (2) both hold.   
The Role of Gender 
Given this general framework, gender may enter the promotion process in a variety of 
ways.  First, structural changes in the economy may cause it to be more profitable to fill some 
jobs rather than others.  To the extent that men’s and women’s jobs are segregated, this raises 
the possibility that the opportunities for promotion may differ for men and women.
8  Whether 
any differential promotion opportunities generated by structural change tend to favor men or 
women remains an empirical question.
9  
Of course, gender may also enter into the promotion equation if men and women 
differ in their endowments of those observed and unobserved human capital characteristics 
associated with productivity in the new job.  While this clearly leads to differential 
productivity, and hence differential promotion chances we do not normally think of this as 
discrimination.  Labor market discrimination, on the other hand, would imply that women are 
held to higher promotion standards so that while  jt s  applies to men, the promotion standard is 
D s jt +  for women where  0 > D  (Olson and Becker, 1983).  In this case, even if men and 
women were equally productive, women would be less likely to be promoted.  Alternatively, 
the desire to achieve affirmative action goals might result in firms setting a lower promotion 
standard for women. 
One can also think of promotion discrimination as a Becker-type taste for 
discrimination that implies an added cost to promoting women and reduces the value of their 
marginal productivity in the new job.  Alternatively, the theoretical models reviewed above 
                                                 
8
 This simply says that  ) ( jt jt c VMP P > differs in men’s and women’s jobs. 
9
 There is evidence to suggest that men and women fare differently through the peaks and toughs of the business 
cycle (Goodman, 1994) raising the possibility that relative promotion opportunities may depend on 
macroeconomic factors.  
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are in essence models of statistical discrimination in which men and women differ in their 
unobserved probabilities of leaving the firm.  This would imply that the firm perceives the 
marginal productivity associated with particular human capital characteristic to be less for 
women than for men.  In either case, the perceived value of marginal product for women 
would be less than for men with the same human capital endowment resulting in lower 
promotion rates for women even if the promotion standard were the same. 
 
IV. Data   
This study will analyze a sample of white men and women drawn from the NLSY 
which provides panel data for the cohort of individuals aged 14 to 22 in 1979.  In the 1988-
1990 waves, NLSY respondents were asked whether their job responsibilities had increased 
and whether they had received any promotions with their current employer.
10  Individuals 
responding that they had been promoted were asked about the outcome of the promotion (in 
particular, did it result in reporting to a different supervisor).  Due to the panel nature of the 
data, we are also able to directly measure the outcome of a promotion by observing the annual 
wage changes of promoted and non-promoted workers.  
The sample is restricted to white men and women not in the military sample who were 
interviewed in the NLSY in each year between 1988 and 1990.  Self-employed individuals 
and those working for no pay have been dropped from the sample.  The analysis is further 
restricted to promotions in “current jobs” in which respondents had been employed for eight 
weeks and usually worked more than 35 hours per week.  These latter two restrictions are 
necessary because the promotion questions were asked only of these individuals.  “Current 
jobs” are those in which respondents are currently employed or if not currently employed, the 
most recent job.  A small number of observations were dropped because reported hourly 
wages were less than $1.50 or more than $300.00 or because they contained missing 
information on one of more other key variables (most notably AFQT scores).  These 
restrictions resulted in observations for 2076 men (4985 observations) and 1809 women 
(3885 observations).  Of these, 1239 men and 830 women were asked about promotions in all 
three years.
11
  Given these sampling restrictions, the results discussed below are most 
                                                 
10 Respondents were also asked about promotions in 1996, but, a number of changes in the specific questions 
asked and the survey methodology led me to drop the 1996 data in order to maintain consistency.  (See Cobb-
Clark and Dunlop, 1999.) 
11  Note that because the NLSY asks about promotion “since the date of the last interview” the sample has been 
restricted to individuals interviewed in all three years to avoid particularly long spells between interviews.  
8 
informative about gender differences in promotion rates among young, white, full-time 
workers with relatively continuous labor market attachment.  Workers—particularly 
women—with weaker labor market attachment are likely to be underrepresented in the data.  
In light of this, it is likely that the results provide a conservative estimate of the gender gap in 
promotions among young workers.  Estimates of the gender gap in promotions obtained from 
alternative samples will be considered further below.  Finally, employment growth rates for 
detailed occupations and industries are calculated from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
and appended to each record.
12
 
There are advantages and disadvantages to using NLSY data to study promotions.
13 
Analyzes of single firms, and to a lesser extent, analyzes of specific occupations allow 
general work conditions to be controlled which is clearly an advantage.  At the same time, 
that approach does not allow us to draw conclusions about how these same firm 
characteristics affect promotion (Hersch and Viscusi, 1996).  Thus, it is important to also 
analyze representative groups of workers (like the NLSY) even though some of the relevant 
characteristics of an individual’s work environment might be unobserved.
14  Like other 
worker-based data sources, the NLSY provides a measure of self-reported promotion which 
as McCue (1996) notes, does rely on some commonly perceived notion of what it means to be 
promoted.
15  Finally, our focus is necessarily restricted to internal promotions.  While this is 
common to almost all empirical studies of promotion it does raise the possibility that our 
perceptions about gender and promotions may be distorted by gender differences in the 
tendency for workers to be promoted when changing firms or to leave the firm in the absence 
of promotion.
16   Pergamit and Veum (1999), however, suggest that NLSY data do not 
provide strong evidence directly linking promotion receipt and subsequent job turnover. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Individuals may not, however, have been asked about promotion in all three years either because they had not 
been employed for eight weeks or because they usually worked less than 35 hours.  
12 Employment growth was calculated as the log change in current employment from the average employment in 
the previous two years. Growth rates were calculated for 41 occupations and 45 industries. 
13  See also Pergamit and Veum (1999). 
14 Abraham and Medoff (1985) are among those who criticize the use of nationally representative data to study 
promotions saying that at best we would learn something about the average promotion process.  
15
 This does have the advantage of allowing us to identify promotions independently from wage changes 
(Killingsworth and Reimers, 1983). 
16
 Booth, et al., (1998) appear to be able to identify workers who were promoted when changing employers, but 
focus only on internal promotions to maintain consistency with their theoretical model.  See Eberts and Stone 
(1985), Johnson and Stafford (1974), and Long, Allison, and McGinnis (1993) for examples of studies that do 
make some allowance for external promotion in their analysis.  
9 
Table 1:   Type of Promotion by Year and Gender  
(Percent) 
      
  Total 1988 1989 1990 
All  Workers      
    Promoted  26.1  29.6  24.2  24.6 
    Promoted/Responsibilities Increased  18.9  23.3  18.9  14.7 
    Promoted/Report to New Supervisor  8.6  12.5  9.7  3.9 
    N  8870  2894  2991  2985 
      
Men      
    Promoted  27.0  30.9  24.6  25.8 
    Promoted/Responsibilities Increased  19.4  24.3  19.7  14.5 
    Promoted/Report to New Supervisor  8.7  12.8  9.7  3.8 
    N  4985  1619  1685  1681 
      
Women      
    Promoted  24.9  27.9  23.7  23.0 
    Promoted/Responsibilities Increased  18.2  22.0  17.8  15.0 
    Promoted/Report to New Supervisor  8.5  12.2  9.8  3.8 
    N  3885  1275  1306  1304 
 
 
In Table 1 the promotion rates for men and women are presented.  Individuals in the 
sample reported an overall promotion rate of 26.1 percent per year between 1988 and 1990.  
The overall promotion rate was significantly higher for men (27.0 percent) and than for 
women (24.9 percent).  In addition, a total of 18.9 percent of the sample reported both that 
they had been promoted and that their job responsibilities had increased.  Only 8.6 percent of 
individuals reported both being promoted and reporting to a higher level supervisor.  Using 
these latter two definitions of promotion the gender gap in the rate of promotion becomes 
insignificant.  These overall promotion rates are somewhat higher than the 9.2 percent and 
11.6 percent reported for a representative sample of British men and women (Booth et al. 
1998).  This is not particularly surprising since the NLSY represents a cohort of young 
individuals—aged 23 to 30 in 1988—who are likely to be making fairly rapid career  
10 
progress.
17  Descriptive statistics for the men and women in the sample are presented in 
Appendix Table A1. 
 
V.  Getting Ahead: Gender Differences and the Promotion Process 
Estimating the Determinants of Promotion 
The theoretical framework outlined above suggests that promotion is a function of: 1) 
the probability that the firm decides to fill the position; 2) the probability that the worker 
meets some standard; and 3) the probability that the worker is the most qualified candidate.  
Unfortunately, existing data sets do not provide information about the expected productivity 
of other workers who were considered, but not selected, for a given promotion.  This prevents 
the inclusion of a worker’s relative productivity in the analysis.
18  
Given this, the promotability of worker i to job j in time t (P
*
ijt ) is assumed to be 
given by the following:  
                                              ijt i ijt ijt v u Z P + + = γ
*                                                      (4) 
where  Zijt is a vector of worker characteristics (both human capital and demographic) 
affecting expected productivity and the firm and labor market characteristics (occupation and 
industry growth rates) which influence productivity and the probability of the firm deciding to 
fill job j .  Finally,  i u  is an individual-specific effect and ε ijt is a random error term.
19  
We do not directly observe promotability, but we do observe actual promotions.  We 
begin by coding workers as having been promoted whenever they report having received a 
promotion with their current employer since the last interview (or since the start of the job). 
The focus is on this definition of promotion because it is most consistent with previous 
studies.  Alternative definitions of promotion are considered in subsequent parts of the paper. 
One of the advantages of using NLSY data to study gender differences in promotion is 
that we have good measure of actual labor market experience.  This is important because 
potential experience measures based on age and education are particularly problematic for 
women who may have more discontinuous labor market histories.  Both tenure with the 
                                                 
17
 In 1996, the promotion rate of NLSY individuals was approximately 16 percent (Cobb-Clark and Dunlop, 
1999). 
18  The 1990 NLSY does ask promoted individuals whether other individuals had also been considered for the 
promotion.  Only about one third of respondents indicated that they had competed with others for their 
promotion (Pergamit and Veum, 1999).  Unfortunately, the NLSY does not provide any information about the 
characteristics of these other individuals. 
19  Both  i u  and  ijt ε  are assumed to be normally distributed with zero means and independent of one another.  
11 
current employer and pre-employer labor market experience will be included in the model
20 
and age will be omitted from the analysis.
21   Much of the previous literature estimates a linear 
(Hersch and Viscusi, 1996) or quadratic (Booth, et al., 1998) relationship between employer 
tenure and promotion, however, specification tests provide strong evidence that the 
relationship for young workers is better captured by a cubic.  At the same time, specification 
tests suggested that education is best captured by a quadratic function. 
Table 2 presents the estimated determinants (marginal effects) of promotion obtained 
from a random-effects probit model.
22, 23
  The model was estimated first for all workers and 
then separately for men and women using the unbalanced sample.
24   
Young white women captured in the NLSY are estimated to have a 5.8 percentage 
point lower probability of being promoted than similar young men.  This lower promotion 
rate for women is consistent with other U.S. studies based on samples of representative 
workers (Olson and Becker, 1983; Hachen, 1988; McCue, 1996; Pergamit and Veum, 1999).  
In contrast, Booth, et al. (1998) find that British women have a about 2.5 percent higher 
probability of being promoted, although this gap disappears once occupation is controlled.
25  
Married women appear to have a lower probability of being promoted, though the 
effect is not significant.  Young children reduce the probability of promotion for young 
women by 8.8 percentage points, but are not significantly related to the promotion rate of  
 
                                                 
20
 Each year information is obtained about the number of hours worked since the last survey.  This information 
was summed to create a full-time equivalent weeks of experience measure.  Overall experience was then 
divided into experience obtained before and after being employed with the current employer.  
21
 Age is sometimes used to control for life cycle or ageing effects.  Because NLSY respondents are young and 
within a narrow age range  (24 to 32 in 1989) it seems unnecessary to allow for either of these effects. 
22
 All estimation was done in STATA 6.0.  Likelihood ratio tests rejected the hypothesis that individual effects 
were not present in the data and a random-effects model was adopted.  (See Booth, et al., 1998 who also use a 
random-effects model to estimate the determinants of promotion.)  However, the random-effects methodology 
is limited by the assumption that there is no correlation between any of the explanatory variables and the 
individual effects themselves.  Conditional fixed-effects logit models would not require this assumption, but 
would also not allow us to estimate the gender gap in promotions or to calculate marginal effects.  Similarly 
NLSY data are not well suited to the estimation of duration models because the time of promotion is known 
only in the more detailed 1990 data.  (See McCue, 1996 for estimation of this type of model using PSID data.)  
Given this I have chosen to focus on the random-effects results in spite of the potential correlation problem.  
Results from alternative estimation strategies are considered further below and are available upon request. 
23
 The marginal effects are the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each variable evaluated at 
the total sample means.  The marginal effects calculated at the gender-specific means are virtually identical.  
Note that the continuous approximation has been used for all discrete variables and that robust standard errors 
are used throughout the analysis.  Probit coefficients are available upon request. 
24
 Estimates for the balanced sample are substantially the same with the exception that very young children do 
not significantly reduce the probability of promotion for women in the balanced sample.  Additionally, the 
gender gap in the probability of promotion is 5.8 percentage points in the unbalanced sample versus 6.7 
percentage points in the balanced sample. 
25 Ignoring the presence of individual effects and estimating a standard probit model reduces the gender gap in 
promotion rates from 5.8 to 5.4 percentage points.  Excluding the low-income supplementary sample increases 
the gender gap to 6.9 percentage points.  These results are available upon request.  
12 
Table 2:  Determinants of the Probability of Promotion  
(Random Effects Probit Marginal Effects
A and z-Statistics) 
 
  Total Men  Women 
  Margin z-stat Margin  z-stat  Margin  z-stat 
Demographic Characteristics           
Female  -0.058  -4.57       
Married  -0.013  -1.11 -0.001 -0.07  -0.023 -1.57 
Presence of Child Aged 0  -0.021 -1.09  0.004  0.15  -0.072  -2.46 
Presence of Child Aged 1 —5  0.000 -0.01  -0.010  -0.48  0.010  0.55 
Human Capital Characteristics 
         
Education  0.075 3.83  0.099  3.90  0.033  1.04 
Education^2  -0.003  -3.99 -0.004 -3.88  -0.001 -1.23 
AFQT Score  0.000 -1.00  -0.001  -2.01  0.000  0.71 
Number of Previous Jobs  0.007 4.70  0.008  3.81  0.006  3.03 
Pre-Employer Experience/100  -0.032  -2.88 -0.026 -1.68  -0.045 -2.59 
Pre-Employer Experience^2/1000  0.035 2.26  0.029  1.46  0.054  1.89 
Employer Tenure  0.002 8.78  0.002  5.93  0.002  6.96 
Employer Tenure^2/100  -0.001  -9.16 -0.001 -6.03  -0.001 -7.27 
Employer Tenure^3/1,000,000  0.008 8.35  0.007  5.38  0.010  6.74 
OccupationB 
         
Managers and Professionals  0.043 1.67  0.026  0.71  0.063  1.89 
Sales  0.007 0.23 -0.022 -0.51  0.043  1.12 
Administration/Support  0.002 0.06 -0.051 -1.15  0.046  1.30 
Service  -0.055  -1.77 -0.098 -2.17  -0.011 -0.28 
Precision Craft  -0.033  -1.11 -0.054 -1.34  -0.058 -1.03 
Operators/Laborers (inc. Tansport)  -0.100  -3.46 -0.115 -2.88  -0.098 -2.38 
Employer Characteristics 
         
0 - 100  Employees  -0.024  -1.59 -0.040 -1.78  -0.014 -0.76 
100 to 499 Employees  -0.010 -0.57  -0.028  -1.15  0.009  0.44 
Covered by Collective Bargaining  -0.081  -4.83 -0.083 -3.76  -0.078 -3.14 
Employer Has Multiple Locations  0.057 4.79  0.068  3.99  0.040  2.54 
Public Sector Firm  -0.036  -1.83 -0.003 -0.09  -0.061 -2.46 
Labor Market Characteristics 
         
Unemployment 6 - 8.9%  -0.008  -0.67 -0.013 -0.76  -0.006 -0.38 
Unemployment 9.0+ %  0.041 2.05  0.014  0.51  0.072  2.57 
Occupational Growth Rate  0.072 0.55 -0.115 -0.60  0.249  1.49 
Industry Growth Rate  0.235 2.08  0.225  1.49  0.188  1.15 
Miscellaneous 
       
1989  -0.057  -4.83 -0.078 -4.72  -0.031 -1.95 
1990  -0.044  -3.52 -0.063 -3.51  -0.027 -1.64 
Being in Balanced Sample  0.035 2.79  0.044  2.37  0.021  1.30 
N 8870  4985  3885 
AThe continuous approximation is used to calculate the marginal effects for discrete variables. 




26  It is unclear is whether this reflects demand-side factors on the part of firms or 
supply behavior on the part of women themselves.  Interestingly, however, the overall gender 
gap in promotions is not driven exclusively by differences in the effect of young children on 
the probability of getting ahead.  The gender gap in promotions is 5.4 percentage points 
among men and women without young children and 5.2 percentage points among those with 
no children at all. 
There are also gender differences in the importance of education for getting ahead.  
Education is not significantly related to the promotion of women, but there is a strong 
quadratic relationship between education and the probability of promotion for men.  The 
probability of promotion increases with additional education for men, reaching a maximum at 
approximately 13 years of education, and declining thereafter.
27  Net of other factors, higher 
AFQT scores are associated with a small decrease in the probability men will be promoted.
28   
In other ways the promotion process appears to operate similarly for men and women.  
In particular, there are similarities in the way in which career paths before and after joining 
the current employer influence promotion.  The returns to employer tenure are the same for 
men and women, and for both men and women the probability of promotion increases with 
employer tenure reaching a maximum at approximately three years and then beginning to 
decline.  Eventually at very high levels of employer tenure the estimated probability of 
promotion begins to increase again.  There is a positive relationship between the number of 
previous jobs held and one’s promotion chances with the current employer.  Still, labor 
market experience acquired before joining one’s current employer is negatively related to the 
probability of being promoted in the current job.  Thus, it is those individuals previously 
making a number of rapid job changes who are relatively likely to be promoted. 
Firm structure itself influences the probability of promotion for both men and women 
in a similar way.  Promotion rates are higher in firms operating in multiple locations.   
Workers appear to benefit from being employed in firms with large internal labor markets 
perhaps because of more opportunities for internal transfer.  Relative to the private sector, 
                                                 
26
   Including part-time workers in the sample strengthens the negative effect of marriage, but mitigates the effect 
of children somewhat.  The magnitude of the gender gap remains much the same, however. 
27
 Pergamit and Veum (1999) in contrast conclude that education is not significantly related to promotion for 
either men or women.  Their conclusion appears to stem from the linear specification of the effects education 
on promotion.  Re-estimating equation (5) without the quadratic term also results in insignificant education 
effects for men whether or not the full 1988 – 1990 NLSY data are used or whether the sample is restricted to 
only 1990 as in Pergamit and Veum’s  case.   
28 1989 AFQT percentile scores are used throughout the analysis.  
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women in public sector firms are less likely to report being promoted and all workers covered 
by collective bargaining agreements are promoted less frequently.   
Finally, promotion is closely tied to occupation.  Relative to technicians, workers in 
other occupations—particularly those in relatively unskilled occupations such as operatives 
and laborers—are less likely to report being promoted.  Professionals and managers are 
somewhat more likely to be promoted.  Not surprisingly, the magnitude of these occupational 
differences is sensitive to the definition of occupational groups.  When occupation is omitted 
from the model, industrial and occupational employment growth has a positive influence on 
promotions, particularly for women.  Once differences in occupations are taken into account, 
however, these effects for the most part disappear.  Promotion rates also vary over time.  
Relative to 1988, male promotion rates were 7.8 percentage points lower in 1989 and 6.3 
percentage points lower in 1990 while female promotion rates were 3.1 percentage points 
lower in 1989.   
Consistent with the theoretical framework outlined above, these results support the 
view that promotion chances are in part determined by the probability that firms decide to fill 
higher-level positions.  Promotion opportunities do appear to be related to firm 
circumstances, local labor market characteristics, and macroeconomic conditions, but in ways 
that differ for men and women.  Future research attempting to examine gender differences in 
promotion would benefit from careful consideration of the role of demand-side factors and 
occupation in the promotion process.  Furthermore, though the pattern of promotion rates 
across occupations is similar for men and women, the relative magnitude of occupational 
differences in promotion varies by gender implying that job ladders differ for men and 
women even within occupation.  Thus, analyses of promotion that are based upon a single 
occupation may not be readily generalized.  Finally, differences between these and other 
results based on U.S. data and those obtained by Booth, et al. (1998) using a similar model 
and British panel data raise the possibility that labor market institutions play an important role 
in the relative promotion rates of men and women. 
 
Considering Alternative Definitions of Promotion: 
In an effort to determine the robustness of the above results, equation (4) was re-
estimated using two alternative definitions of promotion.
29  (See Appendix Tables A2 and 
A3.)  First, individuals were coded as having been promoted whenever they reported both that 
                                                 
29
 See Pergamit and Veum (1999) for cross-sectional results for several additional definitions of “promotion”  
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they had received a promotion and that as a result their job responsibilities had increased.  
Second, a promotion was assumed to have occurred whenever a worker reported both a 
promotion and as a result of that promotion that he/she now reported to a different supervisor.  
Using the former definition of promotion reduces the gender gap in promotions from 5.8 to 
3.8 percentage points, while the latter definition results in a gap of 1.0 percentage points.   
Clearly, the size of the gender gap depends on the definition of promotion used.  It is 
unclear whether this results from real differences in the qualitative aspects of promotions for 
men and women or from differences in the tendency to report having been promoted.  It does 
raise the possibility that the use of different definitions of promotion is in part responsible for 
the wide range of estimates of the gender gap in promotions that exists in the literature.  
The Source of the Gender Gap in Promotions 
  What is the source of the gender gap in the probability of being promoted?  To what 
extent is it consistent with labor market discrimination?  This section addresses these 
questions by decomposing differences in the promotion rates of young men and women into 
both returns- and characteristics-related components.  
 Recall  that  Z is a vector of individual and job characteristics that influence promotion, 
while γ is a vector of returns to those characteristics.  Let  j Z ˆ  capture the characteristics of a 
representative person of gender j with  m f j , =  for women and men respectively.
30  The 
predicted gender gap in the probability of promotions is given by: 
  ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ f f m m f m Z Z p p γ γ Φ − Φ = −                                                    (5) 
where  Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and  j γ ˆ  is the vector of 
returns associated with promotions-related characteristics.  Due to the non-linearity of the 
cumulative normal distribution, the gender gap in the probability of promotion is a non-linear 
function of  j Z ˆ  and  j γ ˆ  making standard decompositions impossible.  To avoid this Doiron 
and Riddell (1994) suggest using a linear approximation.  Specifically, 
                                                                                                                                                        
using the 1990 NLSY data. 
30
 The curvature of the normal distribution implies that using the sample means  j Z  to characterize the 
representative person results in predicted probabilities of promotion that are too small relative to the sample 
averages.  Furthermore, the problem is greater for women than for men causing the gender gap in promotions 
to be overstated.  Doiron and Riddell (1994) experienced a similar problem in their analysis of unionization.   
They propose defining a representative person ( j Z ˆ ) such that he (she) has a predicted probability of, in this 
case, promotion equal to the gender-specific sample average and such that his (her) endowments are in the  
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≅ Φ − Φ = −                       (6) 
where ) /( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( f m f f f m m m N N Z N Z N + + = γ γ ψ  is simply the predicted probability of 
promotion for the representative man and woman weighted by the respective sample sizes 
m N and f N .
31  By adding and subtracting  f m Z γ
ψ
ψ ˆ ˆ ) (
∂
Φ ∂
 from the right hand side of equation 
(6) we can decompose the promotions gap into returns- and characteristics-related 
components in the following manner: 
[] ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ˆ f m f f m m f m Z Z Z p p − + −
∂
Φ ∂
≅ − γ γ γ
ψ
ψ
                (7) 
The decomposition given by equation (7) is obviously not unique.  To assess the robustness 
of the results, two decompositions of the promotion gap are considered.  The one given by 
equation (7)—which I call decomposition A
P (which weights by male characteristics)–and 
decomposition B
P (which weights by female characteristics) and results from adding and 
subtracting  ) ˆ ˆ (
) (




Φ ∂  from (6).  The results of both are presented in Table 3.   
On average young men have a probability of promotion that is just over two 
percentage points higher than that of young women.  This gap in promotions is explained by 
differences in the returns to characteristics, with differences in the characteristics of men and 
women serving to reduce the overall gap.  Depending on the decomposition used, the 
differences in the returns to demographic, human capital, and job characteristics discussed 
above combine to explain between 225 and 362 percent of the actual gap.  Women given their 
own characteristics, but men’s returns, would have been expected to have a promotion rate of 
29.4 percent compared to an actual rate of 24.9 percent.  Alternatively, men would have had a 
promotion rate of only 20.3 percent (compared to an actual rate of 27.1 percent) if they had 
been facing women’s returns.32   Similar results are found when we consider our two more 
restrictive definitions of promotion.33  Although the magnitude of the gender gap in 
                                                                                                                                                        
same proportion as the average endowments for the men (women) in the sample. In effect,  j j j Z a Z = ˆ  where 
95 . = f a  and  96 . = m a is a gender-specific scaling factor.  See Doiron and Riddell (1994) for details. 
31
 The first term on the right hand side is the standard normal probability density function evaluated at  . ψ  
32 These predictions were calculated using STATA’s population average random effects model.  See the STATA 
manual for more details. 
33
 These results are consistent with Olson and Becker (1983) who also conclude that if the women in their 
sample had been promoted according to the male standard 32 percent of women would have been promoted 
compared to an actual rate of 19 percent.  Similarly if men had been facing the female promotion standard, 
promotion rates for men would have fallen from 20 percent to 11 percent.  
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promotions depends on our notion of what a promotion is, it remains the case that irrespective 
of how promotion is defined and the particular decomposition used the gap is explained by 
differences in the returns to characteristics.   
 
 
Table 3: Decomposition of Gender Gap in Probability of Promotion and Wages into 
Characteristics- and Returns-Related Components 
(Levels and Percent) 
 
I  Promotion 
  Levels  Actual  Predicted    
        Women  0.249 0.249     
         Men  0.270 0.270     
         Gap  0.022  0.022     
  Decomposition AP  Decomposition BP 
  Decomposition of Promotion Gap  Level  Percent  Level  Percent 
     Characteristics  -0.057  -261.5  -0.027  -125.2 
     Returns  0.079  361.5  0.049  225.2 
     Approximation Error  0.000  0.0  0.000  0.0 
     Total Gap  0.022  100.0  0.022  100.0 
        
II  Promotion Resulting in an Increase in Responsibilities 
   Levels  Actual  Predicted     
         Women  .182  .182     
          Men  .194  .194     
          Gap  .012  .012     
  Decomposition AP  Decomposition BP 
  Decomposition of Promotion Gap  Level  Percent  Level  Percent 
     Characteristics  -0.042  -343.7  -0.027  -225.9 
     Returns  0.054  443.7  0.040  325.9 
     Approximation Error  0.000  0.0  0.000  0.0 
     Total Gap  0.012  100.0  0.012  100.0 
        
III  Promotion Resulting in a Change of Supervisors 
   Levels  Actual  Predicted    
         Women  0.085  0.085     
          Men  0.087  0.087     
          Gap  0.002  0.002     
  Decomposition AP  Decomposition BP 
  Decomposition of Promotion Gap  Level  Percent  Level  Percent 
     Characteristics  -0.007  -399.1  -0.011  -639.4 
     Returns  0.009  499.1  0.013  739.4 
     Approximation Error  0.000  0.0  0.000  0.0 
     Total Gap  0.002  100.00  0.002  100.0 
 
 
These results are consistent with labor market discrimination indeed playing a role in 
promotion outcomes for young U.S. workers.  At the same time, however, differences in the  
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returns to men’s and women’s characteristics may be driven to a degree by unobserved 
heterogeneity which is not accounted for in the estimation process.  For example, 
specialization within the household (Polachek, 1975b) or differences in expectations about 
lifetime labor force attachment (Polachek, 1975a) imply that human capital investment after 
labor market entry may differ for men and women in ways that are not captured by standard 
experience measures.   
VI.  The Consequences of Promotion 
In addition to understanding the gender gap in promotion rates, it is also important to 
assess the consequences of promotion for workers and the implications of promotion 
differentials for relative labor market outcomes.  Do men and women receive the same payoff 
from promotion?  Further, do any gender differences in either promotion rates or in 
subsequent wage growth affect the gender wage gap?  
Wage Growth As a Result of Promotion 
Although the NLSY does not provide information about changes in job level resulting 
from promotion, wage growth provides a measure of the payoff to a promotion.  To assess the 
relative payoffs to promotion, I estimate the following annual log-wage-growth equation: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ln ln ln 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 i i i i i i i i i u u X X W W W ε ε β β − + − + − = − = ∆              (8) 
where  i X  is a vector of human capital characteristics, job characteristics (including position 
in the firm), and labor market conditions.  Promotion is viewed as a change in position. 
Adding and subtracting  0 1 i X β  to the right-hand side of equation (8) results in: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ln 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 i i i i i i X X X W ε ε β β β − + − + − = ∆                              (9) 
The specific form of the equation to be estimated depends on how the returns to 
characteristics change over time.  If the returns are constant so that  0 1 β β β = = , then wage 
growth is solely determined by changes in  i X .  This constant returns assumption was tested 
and rejected, however, and initial characteristics were retained in the model.
34  
Often it is reasonable to assume that promotion is endogenous to wage levels.  The 
standard solution to this problem is to use an instrumental variables approach,
35 but it can be 
                                                 
34
 Alternatively, Keith and McWilliams (1997) argue that the change in returns to characteristics can be captured 
by  0 0 1 δβ β β + =  implying that wage growth is a function of the initial wage level in addition to changes 
in i X . The difficulty with this approach is that individual effects are not removed from the wage growth 
equation.  Loprest (1992) includes some of the X’s believed to determine wages rather than initial wages.  
35  See Booth et al., (1998) who adopt this methodology.  
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difficult to make a case for excluding some variables from the wage equation while including 
them in the promotion equation.  Consideration of wage growth—rather than wage levels—
allows the effects of any unobserved, time-invariant, individual effects to be removed without 
having to rely on the specification of the promotion process and finding suitable instruments. 
Therefore, I analyze the role of promotions in generating wage growth, while acknowledging 
that the wage gains from promotion may be overstated if there are omitted time-varying 
factors that are both positively related to wage growth and the probability of promotion.  
 
 
Table 4: The Effect of Promotion on Wage Growth by Gender and Type of Promotion  








Promotion               
  Promoted  0.0467**  (4.39)    0.0458**  (4.22)    0.0698**  (6.15) 
  Female  -0.0063  (-0.85)             
  Interaction  0.0213  (1.38)             
                
Promotion/Increased 
Responsibilities 
             
  Promoted  0.0447**  (3.63)    0.0445**  (3.59)    0.0805**  (7.31) 
  Female  -0.0081  (-1.16)             
  Interaction  0.0344**  (2.11)             
                
Promotion/Report to 
New Supervisor 
              
  Promoted  0.0168  (1.11)    0.0181  (1.18)    0.0745**  (4.90) 
  Female  -0.0076  (-1.19)             
  Interaction  0.0563**  (2.67)             
** Significant at five percent. 
Notes:  Other controls included in the regression but not reported are a quadratic in education and 
pre-employer experience, a cubic in employer tenure, 1989 AFQT score, firm size, 
occupational and industrial employment growth, number of jobs and dummies for being 
newly married or divorced, experiencing a birth, getting or losing collective bargaining, 
increases or decreases in unemployment, getting sick or well, changing jobs, interrupted 




Equation (9) was estimated by OLS separately for men and women, as well as for the 
total sample.  Though NLSY data do not provide information about initial job level we can 
measure changes in job levels using our three alternative definitions of promotion. The 
coefficients on female, promotion, and a female/promotion interaction are reported in Table 4 
for each of the three definitions of promotion.  
Promotions are positively related to wage growth, particularly for women.  Women 
experience wage gains at promotion that are 2.4 to 5.6 percent higher than for promoted men.  
At promotion, women experience approximately 7.0 to 8.1 percent extra wage growth, while 
for men the relative payoff from promotion is less than 4.6 percent.
36
  Differences between 
these estimates and others in the literature (see Becker and Olson, 1983; Booth, et al., 1998; 
Pergamit and Veum, 1999.) may imply that factors such as workers’ ages, prevailing labor 
market institutions, and the period of analysis all influence the extent to which promotions are 
translated into higher wages.   
 
The Share of Wage Growth Attributable to Promotion 
Additional insights into the relative wage payoff to promotions to men and women 
can be gained by decomposing total wage growth for men and women into a proportion 
resulting from promotion and a proportion occurring in the absence of promotion.
37
  Average 
wage growth,  j W ∆ , can be decomposed into a weighted average of the wage growth for non-
promoted  ) (
n
j W ∆ and promoted  ) (
p




p j j j W p W p W 1 , 0 , ) 1 ( = = ∆ + ∆ − = ∆                                                             (10) 
where  j p  is the probability of promotion for gender j .  Let 
p
o p j W = ∆ ,  equal the wage growth 
that promoted workers would have had if they had not been promoted.  Adding and 
subtracting 
p
p j j W p 0 , = ∆  to the right hand side of equation (10) results in: 








p j j j W W p W p W p W = = = = ∆ − ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − = ∆                        (11) 
The right hand side term of equation (11) can be interpreted as the wage growth that would 
have prevailed had no one been promoted, while the second term on the right hand side 
                                                 
36 In contrast, Pergamit and Veum (1999) find that promotion resulted in somewhat higher wage growth for 
NLSY men than for NLSY women although the difference is not significant.  This finding appears to be due to 
the authors’ focus on the 1990 NLSY cross-section as using equation (9) to estimate wage growth between 
1989 and 1990 confirms their result. 
37
 This is an adaptation of McCue’s (1996) method for decomposing the contribution of promotion and other 
types of mobility to overall wage growth.  
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captures the extra wage growth that promoted workers received upon promotion.  The share 












= = ) ( 0 , 1 ,                                                         (12) 
Although there is little difference in overall annual wage growth for NLSY men and 
women between 1987 and 1990 (see Table 5), the wage payoffs to promotion are much larger 
for women.  Promoted women experienced an average wage growth of more than 10 percent, 
while the wages of non-promoted women grew at a fraction of that rate.  The gap in wage 
growth between promoted and non-promoted men is much smaller.  Using the wage growth 
of non-promoted workers as a measure of what promoted workers would have earned had 
they not been promoted, we find that the share of total wage growth attributable to promotion 
(between 16.3 and 43.0 percent) is much larger for women than for men.  
 
Table 5:  Proportion of Total Wage Growth Attributable to Promotion  










to New Supervisor 
  Men  Women Men Women Men Women 
Total Wage Growth  4.3%  4.4% 4.3% 4.4% 4.3% 4.4% 
         
Rate of Promotion  27.2 24.8  19.6  17.9  8.7  8.5 
         
Actual Wage Growth         
   Promoted Workers  8.3  10.2  8.5  11.7  6.7  12.1 
   Non Promoted Workers  2.7  2.5  3.2  2.8  4.0  3.7 
   Share of Total Wage 













         
Predicted Wage Growth          
   Promoted Workers in  













   Share of Total Wage 
   Growth Due to Promotion 
29.6 38.7  20.5  32.3  3.8  14.3 
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  Using the experiences of non-promoted workers as a measure of what would have 
happened to the wages of promoted workers had they not been promoted is reasonable so 
long as promoted workers are randomly selected with respect to the characteristics 
influencing wage growth.  Given that this is not likely to be the case, estimates from equation 
(10) are used to predict 
p
p j W 0 , = ∆ . 
  Not surprisingly, the estimated wage growth for promoted workers in the absence of 
promotion is larger than the actual wage growth experienced by workers not promoted 
implying that promotion is positively related those characteristics that lead to higher wage 
growth.  Taking this into account reduces—but does not eliminate— the relative gap in the 
proportion of total wage growth due to promotions.  For women, as much as 38.7 percent of 
wage growth occurs at promotion, while for men at most 29.6 percent results from promotion. 
 
Promotion and Changes in the Gender Wage Gap 
Given the large gender differences in the determinants of and returns to promotion 
outlined above, it is interesting to consider how the promotion process itself influences the 
gender wage gap.  This section considers this issue through a number of simulations that 
highlight the relationship between promotion and changes in the gender wage gap. 
Equation (13) shows the gender wage gap in period 1 as a percent of the same wage 


















= ∆                        (13) 
where W ~
is the geometric mean of wages.  The right-hand side of equation (13) is greater than 
one whenever the gender wage gap is smaller in period 1 than in period 0.  
Taking logs of both sides of equation (13) and rearranging results in: 
[ ] [ ]
M M W W W W W W Gap 0 1 0 1 ln ln ln ln ) ln( − − − = ∆                              (14) 
where the first term represents the wage growth for women between periods 0 and 1 while the 
second represents the wage growth of men.
38  If the gender wage gap has narrowed over time 
the right-hand side of equation (14) will be positive.  A widening gap occurs whenever 
equation (14) is negative.  Recalling equation (10) we can view overall wage growth for both 
women and men as a weighted average of the wage growth accruing to promoted and non-
promoted workers as follows: 
                                                 
38 To see this note that  W W ln
~




where all terms are defined as before. 
We are now in a position to consider how annual wage growth (and hence the gender 
wage gap) would have differed had the determinants of and payoffs to promotion been the 
same for men and women.  Table 6 presents the results of a number of simulations in which 
men and women are assumed to retain their own productivity-related characteristics, but are 
alternatively subjected to the promotion standards and wage returns faced by the opposite 
gender.  Equation (15) is then used to assess how the gender wage gap would have been 
expected to change as a result.   
In 1987 the NLSY men in our sample earned $8.42, while women earned on average 
$6.86.  Between 1987 and 1990 the gender wage gap between young women and men was 
constant, narrowing by only about 0.0016 log points per year on average.  We begin by 
considering what would have happened if NLSY women had retained their own 
characteristics, but faced the same promotion process as men.  Similarly, Scenario 2 simply 
assigns men the same promotion process as women.
39  This exercise indicates that eliminating 
gender differences in the way in which productivity-related characteristics affect promotion 
would in and of itself have resulted in an average annual reduction in the gender wage gap 
that was approximately three times as large as the reduction that actually occurred.
40   
  This conclusion is weakened somewhat when women are assumed to face not only the 
same promotion process as men, but also the same wage returns.  Scenario 3 suggests that in 
this case, the change in the gender wage gap would have narrowed by 1.7 times are much. 
When both men and women are subjected to male returns the gender differentials in 
promotion probabilities and the wage gains to promotion are reduced.  Thus, the wage growth 
of men and women is more similar and there is a smaller change in the gender wage gap over 
time.  When both men and women are subjected to female returns, however, women are 
approximately 4.5 percentage points more likely to be promoted.  Additionally, the wage 
gains to promotion remain somewhat higher for women.  Thus, if men had faced the same 
                                                 
39
 Here the wage growth of promoted and non-promoted men and women are retained at their actual level. 
40 Olson and Becker (1983) reach a similar conclusion in their analysis of promotion in the 1970s. 
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promotion and wage process as women, the gender wage gap would have narrowed more than 




Table 6:  Expected Change in the Gender Wage Gap Given Alternative Promotion 
Standards and Wage Payoffs 
(Log Points and Relative to Actual) 
 
    Expected Change in Gender 
Wage Gap 






Average Annual Change in Gender Wage Gap:  -0.0016    
     
Scenario 1: 
Male Returns in Promotion/Own Returns in 
Wage Growth 
   
    Promotion    -0.0051  3.17 
    Promotion Resulting in More Responsibilities     -0.0051  3.14 
    Promotion Resulting in a New Supervisor    -0.0030  1.85 
      
Scenario 2: 
Female Returns in Promotion/ Own Returns in 
Wage Growth 
   
    Promotion   -0.0055  3.41 
    Promotion Resulting in More Responsibilities    -0.0041  2.54 
    Promotion Resulting in a New Supervisor   -0.0019  1.19 
     
Scenario 3: 
Male Returns in Promotion/ Male Returns in 
Wage Growth 
   
    Promotion    -0.0028  1.72 
    Promotion Resulting in More Responsibilities     -0.0039  2.42 
    Promotion Resulting in a New Supervisor    -0.0016  0.97 
      
Scenario 4: 
Female Returns in Promotion/Female Returns in 
Wage Growth 
   
    Promotion    -0.0131  8.12 
    Promotion Resulting in More Responsibilities     -0.0136  8.38 







A better understanding of the promotion process is important for at least two reasons. 
First, in spite of a relatively large empirical literature assessing the relationship between 
gender and promotions, there is remarkably little consensus about what this relationship is.  In 
short, the stylized facts remain unclear.  Second, promotion appears to be closely tied to wage 
growth, particularly for women.  As a result, any gender differences in the promotion process 
have implications for the gender wage gap. 
This study contributes to our understanding of the relationship between gender and 
promotion by considering alternative measures of promotion and by taking advantage of 
panel data for workers employed in a range of occupations and industries.  Previous work 
which focuses primarily on estimating the gender gap in promotions in single occupations or 
firms leaves unanswered the question: How widely do the results apply?  The differences for 
men and women in the estimated relationships between, for example, occupation, firm size, 
collective bargaining status, and labor market sector on the one hand and promotions on the 
other suggest the answer is—not widely at all.   
Young women are less likely to get ahead than similar young men, but the size of the 
gap depends on how promotion is measured.  Differences in the way in which “promotion” is 
measured may be at least a partial explanation for the wide divergence in empirical estimates 
of the promotion gap.  The gender gap in promotions is explained by differences in the 
returns to characteristics.  For women, the number of small children is more closely related to 
getting ahead than is education.  Given their own characteristics, but men’s promotion 
process, women would have a predicted probability of promotion of 29.4 percent compared to 
an actual rate of 24.9 percent.  Men’s probability of promotion, on the other hand, would fall 
from 27.1 percent to 20.3 percent if they retained their own characteristics but faced the same 
promotion standard as their female counterparts.  Thus, although the gender gap in 
promotions is not large and may be drive to an extend by unobserved heterogeniety, it is 
consistent with a form of hidden discrimination in which during the late 1980s young women 
got over the promotion hurtle by being more qualified than their male counterparts.   
Interestingly, Olson and Becker (1983) reached a similar conclusion about the promotion 
process almost two decades earlier.  Eliminating gender differences in the promotion process 
has important implications for narrowing the gender wage gap. 
Getting ahead matters.  Regardless of the definition of promotion considered, the gap 
in wage growth between promoted and non-promoted workers is much larger for women than 
for men.  Women who do not get a head appear to fall further behind.  Whether this results  
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from behavior on the part of workers or on the part of firms is unclear.  Data sets which allow 
us to identify gender differences in the probability of being offered a promotion from 
differences in the probability of accepting a promotion would be useful for sorting this out.  
We also need to carefully consider whether differences a firm’s ability to retain non-promoted 
men and women contribute to an explanation of these results.   
Taken together these results imply that promotion standards are higher for women, but 
women who are promoted have faster wage growth.  Perhaps relative to men, promoted 
women are a more select group.  Perhaps promoted women are promoted further.  Whether 
this results because women have worse outside opportunities in lower job levels as Milgrom 
and Oster (1987) suggest or whether it results because women have better outside 
opportunities in higher job levels as Lazear and Rosen (1990) suggest remains to be seen. 
Future research that generates testable hypotheses and tests alternative theoretical models will 
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Table A1: Characteristics of Workers by Promotion and Gender 
(Percent except as noted) 
  TOTAL M EN W OMEN 
  Percent std.  Percent  std.  Percent std. 
Wages (1983/1984 Dollars)           
Log Wages (log points)  1.976 0.464  2.057  0.464  1.872 0.442 
Wages (dollars)  8.150 7.094  8.844  7.826  7.258 5.908 
Demographic Characteristics           
Married  0.565 0.496  0.579  0.494  0.547 0.498 
Number of Children in Household 
(integer) 
0.738 0.996  0.738  1.011  0.739 0.977 
Presence of Child Aged 0  0.084 0.277  0.096  0.294  0.068 0.252 
Presence of Child Aged 1 —5  0.238 0.426  0.255  0.436  0.216 0.411 
Human Capital Characteristics           
Years of Education  13.261 2.444 13.124  2.547 13.437 2.292 
AFQT (1989)  53.261 27.700  53.266  29.083  53.254 25.821 












Number of Jobs Held (integer)   7.733 4.277  7.825  4.337  7.614 4.195 
Health Limitations  0.034 0.180  0.028  0.165  0.041 0.198 
Had a Break with Employer  0.102 0.303  0.093  0.291  0.114 0.318 
Occupation           
Managers and Professionals  0.258 0.438  0.221  0.415  0.306 0.461 
Technicians  0.047 0.212  0.045  0.208  0.050 0.218 
Sales  0.094 0.293  0.093  0.291  0.096 0.294 
Administration/Support  0.168 0.374  0.069  0.254  0.294 0.456 
Service  0.092 0.289  0.079  0.270  0.108 0.311 
Precision Craft  0.142 0.349  0.232  0.422  0.025 0.157 
Operators/Laborers (inc. Tansport)  0.198 0.399  0.259  0.438  0.121 0.326 
Employer Characteristics           
0 - 100  Employees  0.596 0.491  0.629  0.483  0.552 0.497 
100 – 499 Employees  0.223 0.416  0.208  0.406  0.243 0.429 
500+ Employees  0.181 0.385  0.163  0.369  0.205 0.404 
Covered by Collective Bargaining  0.150 0.357  0.171  0.376  0.123 0.329 
Employer Has Multiple Locations  0.683 0.465  0.665  0.472  0.706 0.456 
Public Sector Firm  0.103 0.304  0.087  0.282  0.124 0.330 
Labor Market Conditions            
Occupational Growth  0.033 0.044  0.033  0.043  0.033 0.046 
Industry Growth   0.032 0.047  0.030  0.048  0.035 0.045 
Area  Unemployment           
     0 — 5.9%  0.647 0.478  0.638  0.481  0.658 0.475 
     6.0 — 8.9%  0.275 0.447  0.274  0.446  0.277 0.448 










Table A2:  Determinants of the Probability of Promotion and Increased Responsibilities  
(Random Effects Probit Marginal Effects
A and z-Statistics) 
 
  Total Men  Women 
  Margin z-stat Margin  z-stat  Margin  z-stat 
Demographic Characteristics           
Female  -0.038  -3.66       
Married  -0.015  -1.55 -0.015 -1.00  -0.016 -1.31 
Presence of Child Aged 0  -0.018 -1.12  0.012  0.55  -0.068  -2.70 
Presence of Child Aged 1 —5  -0.003 -0.28  0.001  0.06  -0.006  -0.37 
Human Capital Characteristics 
         
Education  0.047 2.95  0.066  3.18  0.020  0.76 
Education^2  -0.002  -3.36 -0.003 -3.34  -0.001 -1.08 
AFQT Score  0.000 -1.01  -0.001  -2.20  0.000  0.88 
Number of Previous Jobs  0.004 3.25  0.005  3.00  0.003  1.82 
Pre-Employer Experience/100  -0.011  -1.15 -0.002 -0.17  -0.025 -1.75 
Pre-Employer Experience^2/1000  0.012 0.93  0.000  0.32  0.030  1.27 
Employer Tenure  0.001 6.23  0.001  3.46  0.002  6.02 
Employer Tenure^2/100  0.000  -6.74  0.000 -3.42  -0.001 -6.66 
Employer Tenure^3/1,000,000  0.005 6.42  0.003  3.13  0.008  6.45 
OccupationB 
         
Managers and Professionals  0.062 2.88  0.067  2.13  0.057  2.08 
Sales  0.023 0.93  0.020  0.55  0.028  0.87 
Administration/Support  0.023 0.99  0.027  0.74  0.029  0.99 
Service  -0.019  -0.72 -0.031 -0.80  -0.010 -0.31 
Precision Craft  -0.016  -0.63 -0.018 -0.54  -0.047 -1.01 
Operators/Laborers (inc. Tansport)  -0.070  -2.91 -0.072 -2.12  -0.077 -2.25 
Employer Characteristics 
         
0 - 100  Employees  0.001 0.11 -0.010 -0.54  0.008  0.48 
100 to 499 Employees  0.015 1.11  0.011  0.54  0.017  0.99 
Covered by Collective Bargaining  -0.053  -3.84 -0.065 -3.48  -0.040 -1.96 
Employer Has Multiple Locations  0.047 4.80  0.056  3.99  0.033  2.53 
Public Sector Firm  -0.066  -4.00 -0.044 -1.79  -0.081 -3.81 
Labor Market Characteristics 
         
Unemployment 6 - 8.9%  -0.007  -0.67 -0.009 -0.63  -0.006 -0.48 
Unemployment 9.0+ %  0.019 1.14  0.007  0.30  0.030  1.30 
Occupational Growth Rate  0.060 0.54 -0.134 -0.82  0.180  1.30 
Industry Growth Rate  0.049 0.53  0.075  0.60  -0.010 -0.08 
Miscellaneous 
       
1989  -0.042  -4.38 -0.052 -3.77  -0.031 -2.41 
1990  -0.084  -7.80 -0.116 -7.39  -0.053 -3.77 
Being in Balanced Sample  0.029 2.83  0.035  2.27  0.020  1.53 
      
N 8870  4985  3885 
AThe continuous approximation is used to calculate the marginal effects for discrete variables. 
BTechicians are the omitted category  
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Table A3:  Determinants of the Probability of Promotion and Reporting to a New 
Supervisor  
(Random Effects Probit Marginal Effects
A and z-Statistics) 
 
  Total Men Women 
  Margin z-stat  Margin  z-stat Margin  z-stat 
Demographic Characteristics            
Female  -0.010 -1.89         
Married  -0.003 -0.51  -0.006  -0.75  0.000  0.03 
Presence of Child Aged 0  -0.005 -0.61  0.003  0.27  -0.015  -1.11 
Presence of Child Aged 1 —5  0.003  0.52  0.006 0.68  0.001 0.09 
Human Capital Characteristics 
          
Education  0.022  2.60  0.034 2.99  0.008 0.55 
Education^2  -0.001 -2.80  -0.001  -2.95  0.000  -0.82 
AFQT Score  0.000 -2.97  -0.001  -4.00  0.000  0.14 
Number of Previous Jobs  0.002  3.25  0.003 3.57  0.001 1.20 
Pre-Employer Experience/100  0.006 1.21  0.016  2.20  -0.008  -0.95 
Pre-Employer Experience^2/1000  -0.007 -0.96  -0.161  -1.84  0.013  0.97 
Employer Tenure  0.000  4.05  0.000 2.67  0.001 3.31 
Employer Tenure^2/100  0.000 -3.79  0.000  -1.89  0.000  -3.67 
Employer Tenure^3/1,000,000  0.001  3.61  0.001 1.67  0.003 3.61 
OccupationB 
          
Managers and Professionals  0.038  3.34  0.050 2.94  0.030 1.91 
Sales  0.020  1.50  0.035 1.82  0.006 0.34 
Administration/Support  0.011  0.86  0.021 1.08  0.009 0.51 
Service  -0.001 -0.07  -0.001  -0.06  -0.003  -0.16 
Precision Craft  0.001 0.09  0.004  0.25  -0.003  -0.12 
Operators/Laborers (inc. Tansport)  -0.023 -1.76  -0.020  -1.11  -0.023  -1.20 
Employer Characteristics 
          
0 - 100  Employees  -0.010 -1.58  -0.017  -1.84  -0.005  -0.61 
100 to 499 Employees  0.002  0.34  0.002 0.15  0.002 0.18 
Covered by Collective Bargaining  -0.022 -3.04  -0.026  -2.73  -0.017  -1.44 
Employer Has Multiple Locations  0.031  5.86  0.032 4.28  0.029 3.79 
Public Sector Firm  -0.025 -2.84  -0.015  -1.17  -0.033  -2.72 
Labor Market Characteristics 
          
Unemployment 6 - 8.9%  0.001 0.29  -0.002  -0.25  0.004  0.55 
Unemployment 9.0+ %  -0.003 -0.40  -0.008  -0.71  0.002  0.18 
Occupational Growth Rate  0.066 1.08  -0.044  -0.50  0.156  1.85 
Industry Growth Rate  0.009  0.18  0.013 0.20  0.009 0.12 
Miscellaneous 
        
1989  -0.020 -4.22  -0.028  -4.18  -0.012  -1.82 
1990  -0.074 -11.72  -0.089  -9.76  -0.062  -6.92 
Being in Balanced Sample  0.006  1.22  0.004 0.49  0.010 1.43 
            
N 8870  4985  3885 
AThe continuous approximation is used to calculate the marginal effects for discrete variables. 
BTechicians are the omitted category 